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Abstract. Firstly, this article will examine in the text of 1786, Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren?, 
the chaining of the argumentation used by Kant to reply to the critique arised during the pantheism 
controversy about the passage from the finite to the infinite which became manifest in Germany in 
1785 with the publication of: Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, 
where the author shows that his moral argument of God offers an alternative for both the supernatural 
anti-rationalism of Jacobi and the uncritical rationalism of Mendelssohn. And it also intends to examine 
the critique of Jacobi to the text above mentioned of Kant contained in Appendix of the: David Hume 
über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, ein Gespräch. 
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Resumen. En primer lugar, este artículo pretende examinar en el texto de 1786, ¿Qué significa orientarse 
en el pensamiento?, la cadena de argumentación usada por Kant para responder a la crítica surgida 
durante la disputa panteísta sobre el paso de lo finito a lo infinito que irrumpe en la Alemania de 1785 
con la publicación de Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn.  Con 
su argumento moral de Dios, Kant expone en aquel texto una alternativa tanto para el antirracionalismo 
sobrenatural de Jacobi, como para el racionalismo acrítico de Mendelssohn. También se pretende 
examinar la crítica de Jacobi al texto mencionado de Kant que aparece en el Apéndice  de David Hume 
über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, ein Gespräch.
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1. Mendelssohn and Jacobi
The pantheism controversy (Pantheismusstreit) had as its starting point the letters 
exchanged between Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn in 1784, 
initiated by Jacobi. During this period, Mendelssohn interrupts momentarily his 
writings on Lessing2 and the study of Spinoza to devote himself to understanding the 
ideas of Jacobi. He, who expresses a dogmatism Leibniz-Wolffian, where everything 
is conditioned, does not accept the infinite series of Jacobi. In the letter to Jacobi, 
Mendelssohn writes: 
You say that every generation in the infinite, every modification in it puts something 
out of nothing, and believe that Spinoza rejected, for that reason, every passage of the 
infinite in the finite, and generally speaking, every transitional, secondary or remote 
causes, putting in their place only the immanent, a cause of the immanent world, which 
is immutable eternally in itself, for if a series without beginning does not sound like 
something impossible to Spinoza, then the generation of things by emanation  would not 
lead necessarily to a birth from of anything; and if for Spinoza things are something of 
finite, then one cannot understand absolutely their immanence in the infinite and much 
less their continuation leaving it. If the infinite cannot produce anything of finite, it cannot 
also think anything of finite (Jacobi 1946, p. 136). 
The whole problem here is summed up in the passage from the infinite to the 
finite. Mendelssohn accuses Jacobi to make the passage through a dangerous leap. 
That is, generally speaking, according to Mendelssohn, the Spinoza’s system does 
not seem to be able of facing such difficulties. These difficulties are manifested both 
in regard to the ideas (Gedanke) and in regard to their real objects. What cannot 
become objectively real cannot be subjectively thought3, and the same difficulty that 
Spinoza has to conciliate the reality in the finite out of God, he must also have when 
puts this finite in the divine being and considers it as an idea of divinity4. 
2 According to the opinion of both (Jacobi and Mendelssohn), Lessing was following the steps of Spinoza, what 
was not convenient at the time.
3 Thought very different to that of Kant. The purpose here is different and, we would say, quite dogmatic.
4 Interesting to see about that the text of Schelling: Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kritizismus, 
published almost a decade later in the Philosophisches Journal in 1795. Especially the first four letters. At 
first he deals with access to the idea of a moral God; the second says that the criticism has only weak weapons 
against dogmatism to found your entire system only in nature of our faculty of knowledge, and not in our own 
being originating. The weak reason is not one that does not knows a objective God, but one that wants to know 
him. The criticism does not take upon itself merely to deduce the weakness of reason and to prove, against dog-
matism, just that it is not susceptible to proofs. In the third letter Schelling says that the Critique of pure reason 
offered occasion for misunderstanding: it was just a faculty of knowledge and could not reach the refutation of 
dogmatism but in a negative way, since no theoretical philosophy can go beyond indecisiveness, i.e., cannot go 
beyond proving the theoretical no demonstrability of dogmatism. The original conflict’s own human spirit arises 
when it realize our problem to leave of the absolute: how do we get out of absolute and go to its opposite? In 
the four letter, while making the transition from theoretical into practice philosophy, he shows how we cannot 
reach the unconditional through theoretical philosophy, i.e. even the achieved criticism cannot theoretically 
refute the dogmatism. In his version, is the synthetic judgment that defeats necessarily the dogmatism, since 
the subject as soon as enters in the sphere of the object (when judges objectively), out of himself and is obliged 
to undertake a synthesis. However, we should note that here the criticism, that part of the common point of the 
original synthesis, can only explain this fact from the very faculty of knowledge. This is the case neither Jacobi 
nor Reinhold, both departing from an earlier foundation to the faculty of knowledge.
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This was the first difficulty of Jacobi’s letter, but still comes what Lessing 
considers more obscure in it. It comes to what, according to the expression of Jacobi, 
the infinite cause has of explicit way neither understanding nor will, for due to its 
transcendental unit and its general infinitude, it cannot have any object of thought and 
will (original material). This occurs only because Jacobi denies the first cause, which 
is of infinite nature, of individual ideas, of individual determinations of the will and 
that, moreover, every individual idea must have its origin in another individual idea 
and to report itself immediately to an object really existing. This is the reason why 
Mendelssohn asserts that Jacobi wants to conceive that there is in the first cause 
only the first internal universal element of the understanding and will. However, this 
explanation is as difficulty to understand and accept as the Spinoza’s terms. The first 
cause has thoughts (Gedanke), but not understanding (Verstand), because, according 
to Spinoza, the thoughts are a quality of sole and true substance. Nevertheless, this 
substance does not have individual thoughts, but only the universal element of them. 
As a nominalist, Mendelssohn disagrees that one can conceive the universal without 
the individual, because it is more incomprehensible than a formless matter, that 
an amorphous element or a being which had only universal characters. It sounds 
absurd when Jacobi says that the absolute infinite has no object of thought. This is 
equivalent to say that the infinity is not itself, its qualities and modifications are not 
for it objects of thought. And if it has not object of thought, or of understanding, 
but at the same time the thought is its attribute, then how can it be only the thinking 
substance? Moreover its modifications or accidental things have really individual 
determinations of the will, and not only the universal element. Jacobi recognizes that 
in Spinoza there is a free will put only on an undetermined choice, without intention 
of what is perfectly indifferent. To him, this choice can return to the modification 
of the divinity insofar as it represents a finite being, but insofar as it is an infinite 
being there is no free will without intention. The knowledge of good, which causes 
a free choice, as Jacobi takes it, is part of the qualities of understanding and, to that 
extent, it is the most certain necessity and thus all the consequences that come from 
the knowledge of the true or false, or of the knowledge of good and evil must, in 
theory of Jacobi, have the same necessity. Mendelssohn does not understand why 
Jacobi denies to the infinite cause one eternal and previously determined choice. 
He concludes that, insofar as Jacobi denies the true individuality to the infinite, 
cannot impute will and freedom to it, because those presuppose an individual real 
substantiality.
As we have already said, it is difficult to Mendelssohn to understand how it 
is possible to choose something that is not determined, individualized. Thus, the 
Spinoza’s system is more acceptable to him because everything that is produced in 
the visible world is of the strictest necessity, because everything is founded in this 
way and not in otherwise in the divine being and in the possible modifications of 
its qualities. What is not really produced is neither possible nor conceivable to him. 
In this manner, it would be impossible for Spinoza what is not founded on divine 
modifications while cause necessary of everything.
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Jacobi defends a personal God, as well as Schelling5 later will, so the philosophy 
of Spinoza is seen as atheism to them. If Spinoza had agreed as Bayle, Leibniz and 
others to that only the principle of contradiction puts a limit to the inner possibility, 
would have been necessary to take by real events all novels and fictions. Thus, only 
Spinoza would consider to be impossible what, without contain contradiction, is not 
founded on divine modifications while necessary cause of all things. With this we 
reach the way by which Spinoza would have reached the perfectissimum if he had 
introduced, such as the determinists, on the subject of the idea of freedom. It is only 
in perfectissimum system that can be conceived why is this series of determination 
and not another that is render real in the divine being or, speaking like Spinoza, 
because no other would have been possible
However, Mendelssohn recognizes that the dangerous jump of Jacobi may 
be a salutary expedient to the nature, since devoting himself to the speculation 
of philosophy of Jacobi, he tried to guide by common sense or, at least, his eyes 
sought the path where he could find it again. And as one cannot deny that there were 
intentions there, to have an intention constitutes a possible quality of spirit and, 
insofar as this is not simple inability, must be the good of the whole spirit in the 
highest degree; so, besides thought, there is also a wanting and an acting that can be 
qualities of infinite and then must necessarily be.
What looks like and clarifies, must actually appear. Every phenomenon is, as a phenomenon, 
the highest evidence. Every idea, subjectively considered, is the most certain truth. So the 
force of thinking is also a actually primitive power that cannot be founded on an original 
superior force (Jacobi 1946, p. 140). 
In manuscript of Jacobi, Mendelssohn points a passage that is absolutely 
incomprehensible to him, where the author asserts that the thought is not the source 
of the substance, but the substance is the source of thought. Then, we must admit 
before the thought something that is not thinking as first, something that, according 
to the internal nature of being, must be conceived as anterior (Cf. Jacobi 1946, p. 
140). 
5 Cf. Schelling - Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Just what is personal can save what is personal and 
God must become man so that the man can return to God again. It is only through the re-establishment of the 
relationship of the ground (ground [Grund] is in Act) with God that is restored the possibility of healing (of 
salvation). Schelling also claims that God is not a logical abstraction, since if He would be without personality 
and without conscience, because all that results from Him would also be a logical necessity. The author does not 
accept an impersonal God, dead. What is the personality in God? It consists in linking between something that 
subsists by itself and a basis independent of it, in such a way that both interpenetrate and are just a single being, 
then God is the supreme personality, through the connection of the ideal principle that exists with the indepen-
dent ground (relative to that principle), since the basis and the existing that there is in Him unite themselves 
necessarily in a single absolute existence. It comes to the unity between the ideal and real (body and soul). In 
Leibniz there is just ideal. In Fichte, only real. In Spinoza there is something mechanical, lifeless, impersonal. 
Para Schelling God is conditioned and unconditioned at the same time, because the condition is in Him. There 
is a system in divine understanding, although God is not a system, but life. Any existence requires a condition 
to become effective, i.e., personal. The existence of God also could not be personal without such a condition, 
but God has that condition in Himself (cause sui) and not out of Himself. He cannot suppress the condition, 
but would have to suppress Himself; He can just dominate it by love and subordinate it to His glorification. In 
God also there was a ground of darkness if he did not do His the condition, if He does not join Himself to it as a 
single thing to be an absolute personality. The ground (there is no morality in this ground) is the same. The per-
sonalities out of it: both that of God and that of creation. In God everything is connected, absolute personality, 
but in the man is not. Obviously, there are many other implications in the philosophy of Schelling, but for now 
this explanation is enough for our purpose in this work.
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Mendelssohn complains that Jacobi confuses abruptly your thoughts about 
Spinozism when he says that the infinite substance of Spinoza has by itself, and 
outside the individual things, no determined complete existence. “For if individual 
things in the system, have their determined real existence and their coexistence is also 
sole only, as then there is no determined complete existence? How can I understand 
or join this with your other expressions”? (Jacobi 1946, p. 141). 
It seems to Mendelssohn that Jacobi assumes something that is not a thought 
that he wants to practice a jump into the void, where the reason cannot follow us, 
still more, he wants to represent by thought something that precedes every thought 
and that even the most perfect understanding cannot think it. I wonder if all these 
pseudo ideas, Mendelssohn puts in question, are not why the Jacobean philosophy 
has the extension and the movement for only matter and the only objects of ideas, 
and still only insofar as of their real existence? This could be why Locke would 
have influenced the philosophers to take the extension, the impenetrability and 
the movement by primitive qualities and to reduce to these the phenomena of the 
other senses, while secondary qualities? However, such a procedure should be more 
feasible according to Spinoza, who takes the extension by a quality of substance sole 
finite
 Jacobi, in the letter, tries to explain again the principle of reality according to 
Spinoza, i.e., he says that the God of this philosopher is the pure principle of reality 
in whole real of being, in whole existence; God is absolutely individuality and is 
absolutely infinite. The unity of this God rests upon the identity of indiscernible and, 
therefore, does not exclude any kind of plurality. Now, Mendelssohn contests, 
whole collectivum lies in the thought that synthesizes the diverse; for, out of thought, 
objectively considered, any individual thing becomes isolated, it is a thing per se, and only 
the relationship there is part of the whole, the member of coexisting. But this relationship 
is an operation of thought, therefore, help me out of the mess in which I find myself 
regarding Spinozism! (Jacobi 1946, p. 144). 
Furthermore, Mendelssohn claims that believes, to date, according to Spinoza, 
only the sole infinite would have a true substantiality, but the diverse finite would 
be only a modification or an idea of infinite. Jacobi reverses it by giving to the 
individual a true substantiality and, consequently, the whole could be only an idea 
of the individual. At other moments, Mendelssohn suggests that Jacobi talks about 
another thing, like for instance, when he seems to agree that, according to Spinoza, 
only the sole substance, transcendent and infinite is possible, and whose qualities are 
the infinite extension and infinite ideas.
The difficulty that it brings resides in the fact that the Spinoza’s system wants to 
make out the unlimited from the synthesis of what is limited. Then, Mendelssohn 
asks:
How can one reach a higher degree for this disjunction? How the intensive can be 
reinforced by increasing of extensive? If in all other systems, the passage from the 
infinite to the finite is difficult to understand, in this system the return of finite in the 
intensive infinite seems to be absolutely impossible. The increase simply never produces 
an elevation of degree, even if we continue to the infinite. If we assign a quantity to the 
degree, here is an intensive quantity that cannot increase the adjunction of similar things. 
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Obviously, here the Spinozism does not confuse the thoughts, and sometimes has the 
plurality no place of inner power? Here I am spinning in a circle from which I do not 
know how to get out!! (Jacobi 1946, p. 145).
Jacobi’s response to this letter in September 1784 is quite annoyed by understand 
that Mendelssohn, besides having not acknowledged him in the text, also distorted 
his statements about the philosophy of Spinoza6. Jacobi felt himself startled of dread 
before the censorship of Mendelssohn of what he would have the extension and the 
movement as a single matter and unique objects of thought. He does not understand 
how could have provided the smallest pretext for what has been assigned to him, 
since there is no opinion in the world that is more distanced than his on this issue. 
2. Kant in the strife
In 1786, Kant writes the essay: Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren?, in which 
expresses more the necessity to combat the risks of enthusiasm that threatened the 
enlightenment than defending himself from critique of opponents. Firstly, Kant 
exposes the method of Mendelssohn, who expected a lot of reason, even the evidence 
of demonstration of knowledge of objects supersensible. The speculative use of 
reason was guided by a certain conducting wire what he called or common sense or 
healthy reason or sometimes simple human understanding. However, according to 
Kant, Mendelssohn was strongly corrected on one thing: in the search of the latest 
touchstone of admissibility of any judgment, it was necessary to be guided by reason 
–and not by the exalted intuition of faith–, was the reason guided in the choice of its 
propositions by knowledge (objective) or by mere necessity (subjective) and by the 
maxims of its own usefulness.
Kant explains in this essay that the reason needs (Bedürfnis) to extend beyond 
the limits of sensible experience, but as it does not find objects of intuition for this 
passage, it cannot submit its judgments according to objective grounds of knowledge, 
then it submits them on the basis of subjective grounds, the only ones that remained 
to it to guide itself in the space of supersensible. As the reason wants to be satisfied in 
its claim, but cannot judge where it does not know what is required for a determinant 
judgment, makes use of a maxim to pronounce the judgment and thus assures us of 
its real possibility. But this need is not fulfilled without first passing through the sieve 
of critique. According to Kant, first of all, we need to examine very well the concept 
that leads us to the supersensible, as for example, if there are no contradictions on it, 
for only after “submit to the pure concepts of understanding at least the relationship 
of the object with the objects of experience, and certainly we do not make it sensible, 
but we always think something supersensible, useful to the empirical use of our 
reason”. Without this caution we could not absolutely make use of such a concept 
without fall into reveries instead of thoughts.
6 Perhaps Mendelssohn had felt offended by Jacobi’s letter, for being in favor of the Christian faith, 
was not an adherent of philosophy of Spinoza by believing that this doctrine would lead to Pan-
theism, which for him was nothing but theism. Lessing would have avowed himself a Spinozist, 
what caused astonishment not only in Jacobi, but also in academy, and as Mendelssohn was devot-
ing himself to the studies and writing about Lessing, suspected that Jacobi has judged to be he who 
influenced Lessing in favor of philosophy of Spinoza, namely this led him to believe that Jacobi’s letter had the 
intention of provocation. 
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But the reason is not satisfied only with the need to establish a concept of 
unlimited to ground the concept of limited, it wants also the presupposition of 
existence of unlimited, since without the same it cannot give to itself “no satisfactory 
basis of contingency of existence of things in the world, much less the finality and 
order that are everywhere in a degree so admirable.” This means that even unable to 
demonstrate the impossibility of finality without an intelligent first cause, since we 
deal here with subjective grounds, we need to presuppose an intelligent creator and 
give an intelligent basis for the limited.
But, in fact, to admit a creative existence in order to judge the first causes of the 
whole contingent and also the order of ends effectively put in the world is a necessity 
of the theoretical reason, a conditioned necessity. Much more important, says the 
author, “is the necessity of reason in its practical use, because it is unconditioned 
and we are obliged to presuppose the existence of God not only if we want to judge, 
but because we must judge. For the practical use of pure reason consists in the 
prescription of moral laws “.
According to Kant, the mistake of Mendelssohn was to judge the subjective 
speculation as able to achieve everything by itself on the path of demonstration. 
He did not realize that he did not guide himself in the speculative thinking through 
knowledge, but by necessity felt of the reason that, in turn, is not an objective principle 
of reason, of knowledge, but one merely subjective (a maxim) “which makes up by 
itself the whole ground of determination of our judgment on the evidence of the 
supreme being”.
The expression “proposition of reason”, which ambiguity can lead to 
misunderstandings, confused Mendelssohn, because he made it as a judgment 
from the rational objective understanding, and also Jacobi, who bet on it as being a 
judgment of rational inspiration. To avoid misunderstandings like these ones, Kant 
states that the only appropriate term for this source of judgment is rational faith. 
Faith that is based solely on the data contained in pure reason.
All faith is opposite to wisdom for being an assent subjectively sufficient, but 
objectively insufficient. On pure rational faith, which Kant calls also postulated, the 
reason does not demonstrate, but presupposes the existence of a supreme being, not 
as a knowledge that accomplishes the logical requirement for certainty, but a assent 
that is not inferior to any other. As a guarantee of credibility to rational faith Kant 
ascribes immutability, because who could refute the proposition that “there is a God” 
if it is not possible to get such knowledge? So, only a pure rational faith may be guide 
of the speculative thinker to orient himself in his rational incursions in the realm of 
supersensible objects. “The concept of God, and even the conviction of its existence, 
can only be found in reason, only from it comes and first come into us, neither for 
inspiration nor for news reported, even though by the highest authority”.
In relation to the ideas of Jacobi, who puts the faith before the reason, Kant stresses 
that the concept of God cannot contradict itself, for that it is necessary a rational 
concept of him. We cannot be convinced first of the existence of the supreme being 
by any intuition; the rational faith has to precede, “and then certain appearances 
or maybe participations can provide opportunity for research, if perchance we are 
authorized to take by divinity what speaks to us and introduce itself to us and, 
according to the opinion, to confirm that faith”.
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3. The philosophy of Jacobi
After the essay of Kant: Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren?, Jacobi publishes 
in 1787: David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, ein 
Gespräch, where he objects the Kant’s ideas. His focal point of objection is the 
idealistic claim of establishing an absolute system of knowledge starting from 
the activity of thought. There the author affirms that God cannot be logically 
comprehended through an act of thought. Thus, taking the philosophy of Hume 
as a reference, Jacobi presents an alternative by faith (Glaube), which is placed at 
the beginning of the process of thought and it acquires a status of finite rationality, 
almost phenomenological. However, this jump for the faith is not blind, as asseverate 
some opponents, but it is conducted under the scrutiny of reason instituted at the end 
of the process of knowledge. Not surprisingly, meantime, the negative reaction of 
the German philosophical world, because how can a knowledge without proof, as is 
the faith, precede necessarily, like ground, and to command sovereignty the scientific 
knowledge that proceeds from demonstrations? In the preface of the work, the author 
cares to keep the confrontation between his realistic conviction and the philosophical 
understanding, but only later, in his later writings, that he makes a distinction more 
rigorously between understanding and reason, what provides a correct philosophical 
status for his fundamental conception of the power of faith, which exceeds the power 
of demonstrative science.
On the contrary to what was thought at that time, the real and truly reason is called 
by faculty of faith, a superior function (Vermögen) above of the reason (Vernunft), 
which is the faculty to presuppose the true, the good and the beautiful in itself, with 
full trust in the objective validity of this presupposition. This new doctrine, without 
wishing to depreciate the credit of reason, would propose itself only in restore it 
completely. Until then, says Jacobi in the preface of the Dialogue, to have truth value, 
everything should be demonstrate twice, alternately, on intuition and on concepts, in 
the thing and in its image or in word, and it is only in word, that we should find truly 
the thing and where it should really be knowable.
The reason, as faculty to elevate the sensuous knowledge, with nothing to add 
to the supersensible, practices a blind function of wanting to rely on itself, since it 
despises the understanding and defends that in virtue of it, with it and thank to it we 
would witness effectively the true in itself, the right science. Thereby, according 
to Jacobi, the reason built a true Babel’s tower, which Kant explored and showed 
that, even at the top of the tower, we are still in the sensuous plane, what renders 
impossible to know the truth in itself that grounds the phenomena.
Jacobi censures the Kantian philosophy by the formalism of its transcendental 
logic. He says that Kant purifies so much the sensitivity, that after this purification 
it loses entirely the quality of sensuous faculty. So the transcendental idealism or 
Kantian criticism that should start rendering possible the true science, on the contrary, 
leaves the science to lose itself in the science, the understanding to lose itself in the 
understanding, all knowledge, without exception, to lose itself in a universal abyss, 
from which would be impossible to come out if the reason, that was not dead but 
in appearance, do not spontaneously resurge from beyond the grave to rise above 
the world and from everything it contains (Cf. Jacobi 1815, pp. 10-20). Namely, 
according to Jacobi, Kant falls into the same idealism that he criticized in Leibniz, 
Berkeley and others.
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The Critique of pure reason mentions a faculty of knowledge of which the human 
is endowed with, approving a necessity much higher than that merely spelling the 
phenomena according to the synthetic unity to read them as experience. But it is 
no less true than the Kantian doctrine, in this sense, is in contradiction with itself, 
because it subordinates, unquestionably, as the understanding to the reason, in a 
manner implicit, as the reason to the understanding, explicitly, and the effect of this 
in the reality becomes quite confused.
Also in Dialectic, Jacobi says that when Kant uncovers the transcendental illusion 
contained on traditional metaphysics and the capacity of reason to liberate itself of 
the constriction suffered by dogma, it does not result only an element destroyed, 
but also and at the same time a positive element: the reason can recognize itself 
in its autonomy as not determined. It is at this point that Jacobi believes that the 
Kantian philosophy is in conflict with itself. On one hand, things in themselves affect 
the mind (Gemüt); on the other hand, the principle of causality that comes from 
the subject leads him to remedy this incongruity through a wider development of 
Kantian thought, the speculative idealism.
This is a reference to the problem of the thing in itself that Jacobi develops in the 
Appendix of the Dialogue called: Über den transzendentalen Idealismus. There is 
the famous phrase from the author: “Without the presupposition of the thing in itself I 
cannot get into the system, and with it I cannot stay there”. It comes to a controversial 
point in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique, where Kant says that “we 
know only phenomena and phenomena are not anything other than representation”. 
The problem that arises concerns the question of representations. According to the 
Kantian doctrine, which allows knowing nothing outside of the representations, it 
would be impossible to know the cause or something prior to the representations. 
On the other hand, must be admitted that something provides representations in us. 
Thus, it remains only the possibility that the cause is in us, and representations seem 
to take place through other representations. This puts the transcendental idealism of 
Kant in an absolute solipsism, resulting in their failure. In short: according to Jacobi, 
the transcendental idealism cannot sustain itself because it presupposes the affection 
from something, what nullifies its own legitimacy and, on the other hand, it does not 
remain without the presupposition of the affection.
Jacobi says that the understanding in Kantian philosophy, being conditioned by 
the sensitivity, cannot develop itself and achieve a real existence, then it is just a 
tool, and producing itself from a sequence of concepts and ascending progressively 
to the Ideas,
it can easily come to imagine that, thanks to these purely logical ghosts, that raises it 
above the sensuous intuitions, it does not have only the power, but even the decisive 
mission to fly over the sensuous world and itself and to achieve on its flight a higher 
science, independently of the intuition, a supersensible science (Jacobi 1815, p. 33).
Jacobi understands that Kant, to remedy the evil of philosophy, surprisingly 
invents a demonstration disproving the previous incomplete idealisms of the 
Descartes, Malebranche and Berkeley through a complete and total idealism: the 
universal idealism. But already after the Prolegomena, this universal and complete 
idealism, that volatilizes both spiritual and bodily worlds, should no longer be called 
idealism, but critical philosophy. It is pleased to admit that the objects correspond 
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to the representations and, by this fact, ends up being a denial of idealism, as Kant 
says, the idealism consists of asserting that there is no other beings but thinking 
beings, and that the other things that we believe to perceive in intuition are only 
representations in the thinking being, to which we do not find as a correspondent 
any object existing outside of these beings. Viz., by the denial of the transcendental 
idealism, Kant maintained absolutely nothing, but quite the opposite: namely, that 
without the other, the I would be impossible.
Philosophy as science cannot exceed the sensuous world, so the criticism replaces 
the lack of proof of the objective validity of Ideas, that the theoretical part of the 
system put in full light, by the introduction, in practice part, of a faith, but not a 
mere faith, but a rational faith that, as such, rises in full right above every knowing 
of an understanding that, according to the criticism, only refers oneself to sensuous 
experience. But the superiority of the full right of the faith above of knowledge, 
especially of a correct knowing that is directly opposite to it, would be impossible if 
the transcendental idealism had not already deleted all knowing, understood as true 
and objective knowing. Jacobi confirms then that the criticism, from the theoretical 
point of view, ruins the metaphysics for love to the science, and, from a practical 
point of view, it ruins the science for love to the metaphysics.
What distinguish the philosophy of Jacobi of all the existing philosophies 
from Aristotle until our days is the knowledge of a freedom and of a real and true 
providence, not only in the Supreme Being, but in any rational being, as well as 
the assertion of what these two properties presuppose each other. Notwithstanding 
the author complains that nobody admits in an explicit way, neither with him, the 
marvelous efficacy of providence as the absolute beginning, nor with Spinoza, 
as sectarian of fatalism. With Jacobi nobody matches because the understanding, 
which supports itself totally on the principle of causality7, cannot see in the opposite 
of necessary but a hazard without rule. With Spinoza8 nobody agree because the 
proposition: “every event and every action produce itself according to a general 
necessity of nature”, has against it its moral conscience and all human feelings, 
because it disappears all attribution and the attribution of the works and of the acts, 
as well as its own personality. 
The remedy that is sought then as in one case as in the other is the following, 
according Jacobi: it is assumed that the reason is blind at the origin and in this state 
it is qualified as absolute; identifying it then to the necessity, what allows to the 
latter presents itself as rational secretly and thus to discard as soon as possible the 
7 The comment of the French edition of this text of Jacobi, Louis Guillermit (2000), p. 271, says the following: 
“Jacobi discusses a recurring theme in his work: ‘the inseparability of the concept of freedom and providence of 
the concept of reason’. Jacobi (1815, p. 315) says: ‘by the word freedom I assign the power that allows the man 
to be himself and be the sole author, in him and outside him, of his action, of his work and of his production’. 
While this freedom is opposed to the necessity, providence is opposite to the ‘blind fatality, to the random, 
because it is not in relation to the necessity which opposes itself to the random, but in relation to the intention’ 
(Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung, Werk. III, p. 394 - note by Guillermit, French translation 
(2000), p. 426). About the notion of mechanics: ‘I have already remembered before and I would remind once 
again that in my written where intervene the words mechanism and mechanical, without another accuracy, one 
must understand with that all necessary chaining, and in a broad sense, the notion of mechanics encompasses 
all that is a necessary consequence in time according to the law of causality; consequently, even the chemical, 
organic and psychological effects, in a word, everything that is manifested solely according to the course of 
nature and that is assigned solely to their strengths’ ( Werk, II, p. 316)”.
8 Jacobi: inseparability of the concept of freedom and of providence with the concepts of reason and necessity. 
The four leading to unconditioned. In Spinoza, the concept of freedom is contrary to the concept of reason.
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inconvenience blind destiny (the necessity deprived of reason), since the concepts of 
rational and necessary are equivalent and, being the first reflex of the second, then 
the concepts of necessity and freedom could not be concepts that oppose themselves 
and exclude each other. Then is evident that the concepts of freedom, rationality and 
necessity coincide in the single concept of unconditioned or of eternal substance of 
things and of eternal original force in that substance. Thus, it is the end of the puerile 
dream of many, because the free (God) is no longer suspended as the creator above 
of nature, but the founder of it, under the title of only true being (the unconditioned 
being). The reason treated here is the absolute and it makes unity with the necessity.
Jacobi develops a very persuasive speech in favor of the miracle of providence. He 
says that although it is impossible any demonstration about it, there is no absurdity 
in thinking it, and that the scientific findings also, at first, have been discredited due 
to its abstraction and unknown origin. The object may be infinite, this is no longer 
before the eyes of who would frighten with it, but it is solely before the human 
intelligence which is able to rise above the object and put an end to the miracle 
thanks to science9. It is only because the science is in favor of our spirit we can find 
its dignity. Only that one who believes in other purposes may denominate the order 
in the world as purpose. The true meaning of direction of course in the world or its 
purposes resides simply in the sense of the human, and
if a scientist of the future could put under our eyes a mechanics of the human spirit 
that was as universal, intelligible and evident as the celestial mechanics of Newton, our 
admiration, the only directing to human faculty of knowledge, would cancel itself, and 
no longer would be possible for us to honor truly and reflectively, neither art nor superior 
science (philosophy), nor a any virtue. It would be impossible for us to consider it sublime 
and take it with veneration. The spirit no longer would be snatched up by the aesthetic 
pleasure (Jacobi 1815, pp. 52-3).
Thus, for Jacobi, is not a science that eliminates all the miracle, but a belief 
coexisting with science and being unbeatable for it. Belief in a being that can 
only make miracle and that also created the human miraculously, belief in God, in 
freedom, in virtue and in the immortality, a belief which is the good most precious of 
our species, the distinctive mark of humanity and, one might say, the proper rational 
soul, force emanated from God, which is essentially superior to all. Belief is the 
silhouette of the knowing and wanting divine in the finite spirit of human. Without 
the belief (mixed with the knowledge), many strange phenomena in the history of 
mankind would be unresponsive, and the world would be seen by us in the same way 
that it is seen by animals, which are devoid of reason and are not able e.g. to cultivate 
a religion. However, the author warns us to beware of the false beliefs as superstition 
and idolatry. Authentic belief must always be accompanied by the reason or science, 
precisely not to lose itself in superstition. In human consciousness, philosophy starts 
precisely when perceptions (Wahrnehmungen) of sensuous begin to distinguish 
with clarity of apperceptions (apprehension) of supersensible. And so, with regard 
9 Jacobi says that Newton sought a solid fundamental idea, perfectly intelligible, allowing to transform the theory 
Kepler, which was still full of mysteries, in a celestial mechanics totally clear, in which we learn not only to 
understand from a single fundamental law (gravity) all data for the past and for the future, but also that we can 
follow the master with full confidence in his assumptions about the first constitution of the planetary system.
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to virtue, to freedom, to the spirit and to God, it is only possible to believe10; since 
according to the arguments of Jacobi, no demonstrations have value before sensuous 
intuition, because every demonstration is just an extension from concept to sensuous 
intuition (empirical or pure) that verifies it. So, for lack of a better expression to 
denote the way that is given to understanding to know solely in transcendent feelings, 
which are inaccessible to the senses, but nevertheless knowable as something truly 
objective, the author uses the term “intuition of reason”.
[…] before anything else it is necessary for us to have this very fixed: in the same 
way that there is a sensuous intuition provided by the senses, there is also a rational 
intuition provided by reason. Both, one in the face of another, have two own sources 
of knowledge, and not allow itself to derive one from the other. Two are exactly in the 
same proportion with the understanding, and indeed, also with the demonstration. With 
respect to the knowledge of nature, this intuition is the beginning and the end, what counts 
unconditionally, the absolute. For the same reason, no demonstration is worth against the 
rational intuition, intuition of reason, which gives us the certainty of its reality and truth 
(Jacobi 1815, p. 59).
In other words, the truth and the reality of nature (or absolute) are given 
immediately, which shows the realism of Jacobi and, in this sense, it differs totally 
from Kant, who would never accept an intuition of reason, which he calls an exalted 
intuition under the name of faith. In Kantian philosophy only imagination can intuit, 
because intuition is possible only from what can affect our sensitivity. Thus, Jacobi 
founds his philosophy in feeling, but an objective and pure feeling, a reliable spirit 
which leads immediately on it all truth, that recognizes its authority as sovereign, 
and where it presents itself as doctrine of supersensible, which is grounded just on 
that authority. This faculty of feeling in man is superior than all the others, is the 
only one that distinguishes him specifically of the animal, only it raises him above 
himself, not simply in degree, but in nature, i.e. incomparably. According to the 
author, this faculty of feeling makes unit with reason, or what we named reason and 
put above the simple understanding applied only to the nature originates solely and 
exclusively from the faculty of feelings. “In the same way that the senses inform 
understanding in sensation, reason informs in feelings; and representations of which 
we are informed only in the feeling, we call ideas”.
Even though Jacobi has to explain how he does the passage from sensuous to 
supersensible, for, how can the supreme concept which is purely negative to acquire 
objectivity and scientific value? He responds: through the concept of freedom as the 
true concept of unconditioned. The negative concept does not acquire positivity by 
the necessary causal series of nature, i.e. by binding itself with the concept of an 
infinite time and infinite mechanism that manifests itself in nature, since in these 
series
there is neither beginning nor end, nor what [was] and nor for what [wozu], and more, 
the concept of infinite mechanism of nature itself must appear to the understanding how 
impossible. So only the philosopher opposes the obvious existence in sensuous reality 
this impossibility on the concepts, the undeniable presence of the causal link as law 
10  In relation to the feeling of the spirit we can only say that we believe, but we never know.
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in the world, even though remains absurd admit it without beginning and without end 
and starting from preposition: nothing is unconditioned except the causal link itself, the 
simple become proceeding from becoming [das blosse Werden aus dem Werden]. (Jacobi 
1815, p. 80).
The concept of freedom can reach the roots of the human spirit constraining the 
human soul to desire a knowledge of unconditioned situated beyond the conditioned. 
Without awareness of this concept, Jacobi says, nobody would know that the 
limits of conditioned are limits, “if reason does not approve the positive feeling of 
a world higher than the world of the senses, never the understanding could leave 
the circle of conditioned and would never have acquired the negative concept of 
unconditioned” (Jacobi 1815, p. 81). However, it is absurd to put a negation at the 
top of all philosophical thought, but the feeling of reason overcomes this absurd 
that is the result of understanding, and how abstraction can progress until the more 
general, until the more indeterminate, one takes the absolutely indeterminate by true 
unconditioned, by very concept of freedom, and seeks its roots in understanding 
ignoring the true source: the perception of reason. Because is precisely the spirit that 
acts immediately without consciousness, and even in the man, what on him produces 
without conscience as a strange inspiration, one name more specifically the spirit, 
the genius, the divine. For Jacobi, the divine is not anything other but the simple 
agent force of a universal spirit that ignores itself. The true being, the simply being 
can only be known in the feeling, where the spirit manifests itself. Jacobi avows to 
be unable to explain in what way in the pure and objective feeling the spirit becomes 
present to the man and allows him to know what is similar to himself only, and 
have then the conscience of a knowledge that is not simply a dependent knowledge, 
submissive to the proofs, but a independent knowledge above any proof, truly 
sovereign, who inhabits us in the deepest of ourselves. He can only say that is about 
the way of freedom and of providence that reign in us and above us, as forces that 
dominate the nature. Is that so, before these facts and resting on them that the author 
justifies his doctrine with a scientific rigor. From the inseparability of the concepts 
of providence, liberty and reason, Jacobi confronts, in a very concise manner, the 
system of beliefs or justifying of his belief before the philosophical understanding 
(Cf. Jacobi 1815, pp. 106-7). 
The reason, in its primitive state, knows nothing about itself. However, according 
to the author, the concept of a reason, that there is truthfully but that ignores itself, 
far from being contradictory, on the contrary, is necessary: this special reason, that 
ignores itself is properly the authentic reason, the absolute reason, substantial, such 
that it exists and subsists in God; – the absence of a formal reason in God, far from 
being a privation, is a fullness: He is totally reason and therefore, He does not have it. 
On the other hand, is not sleeping “in the darkness of consciousness”, which the God 
(or spirit) creates. He, the original creator, knows and wants that the land to leave of 
empty desert and of darkness,–saying before: Let there be light!
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